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Introduction	  	  Parliamentary	   administrations	   can	   play	   a	   crucial	   role	   in	   the	   process	   of	  parliamentary	  scrutiny	  of	  EU	  affairs.	  The	  requirement	  for	  national	  parliaments	  to	  cooperate	  systematically	  with	  one	  another	  and	  the	  need	  to	  develop	  a	  high	  level	  of	   technical	  and	   legal	  expertise	  has	   led	   to	   the	  proliferation	  of	  a	  network	  of	   the	  permanent	   representatives	   of	   national	   parliaments	   to	   the	   European	   Union	  (NPRs).	   These	   are	   (unelected)	   officials	   that	   are	   delegated	   by	   their	   respective	  national	  parliaments	  to	  Brussels	  for	  a	  certain	  period	  of	  time.	  Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  this	  network	  has	  rapidly	  expanded,	  it	  has	  received	  little	  academic	  attention.	  This	  might	  come	  as	  a	  surprise,	  given	  that	  this	  network	  encompasses	  representatives	  from	   almost	   all	   28	   national	   parliaments1	   and	   some	   bi-­‐cameral	   parliaments	  delegate	   two	   representatives.	   This	   network	   has	   not	   been	   cut	   back	   in	   times	   of	  economic	  and	  financial	  crisis	  but	  has	  expanded	  consistently	  during	  the	  period	  of	  1991-­‐2013.	   Even	   a	   non-­‐EU	   Member	   State,	   Norway,	   now	   delegates	   a	  representative.	  	  	  This	  network	  is	  seen	  as	  the	  most	  established	  form	  of	  transnational	  cooperation	  between	  parliamentary	   bureaucratic	   actors	   at	   the	   EU	   level,	   but	   other	   forms	   of	  cooperation	  between	  officials	  do	  prevail,	   such	  as	   cooperation	  between	  officials	  within	   the	   COSAC	   Secretariat.	   2	   While	   the	   main	   focus	   of	   this	   paper	   will	   be	  directed	   towards	   the	   network	   of	   the	   permanent	   representatives	   of	   national	  parliaments,	  we	  thus	  put	  it	  into	  context	  by	  comparing	  it	  to	  other	  forms	  of	  trans-­‐national	  bureaucratic	  cooperation.	  	  	  This	   should	   then	   enable	   us	   to	   answer	   the	   more	   analytical	   question	   whether	  
parliamentary	   officials	   operating	   within	   trans-­‐national	   bureaucratic	   networks	  remain	   representatives	  of	   “their”	   respective	  national	   parliament	   in	  Brussels	   or	  adopt	  a	   trans-­‐national,	   “European”	  stance?	  This	  question	   is	   important	  as	   it	  has	  implications	  for	  democratic	   legitimacy.	  On	  the	  one	  hand	  we	  might	  observe	  that	  actions	  of	  unelected	  parliamentary	  officials	  are	  no	  longer	  exclusively	  determined	  by	  their	  principals	  (in	  this	  case	  directly	  elected	  members	  of	  national	  parliaments	  (MPs).	  On	  the	  other	  hand	  we	  might	  find	  that	  parliamentary	  officials	  operating	  at	  the	  EU	  level	  actually	  assist	  MPs	  in	  performing	  their	  tasks	  in	  EU	  affairs	  and	  lead	  to	  
                                                1	  The	  position	  for	  the	  Slovak	  and	  Bulgarian	  parliament	  	  is	  currently	  vacant.	  This	  is	  however	  to	  be	  filled	  again.	  2	  Officials	  do	  attend	  and	  prepare	  meetings	  inter-­‐parliamentary	  meetings	  such	  as	  Inter-­‐parliamentary	  Conference	  on	  CFSP/CCDP	  or	  the	  Speakers	  Conference.	  These	  are	  however	  rather	  incidential	  forms	  of	  cooperation.	  	  
3	  	  
outcomes	  that	  might	  otherwise	  not	  be	  achieved.	  The	  latter	  is	  especially	  relevant	  in	   light	   of	   the	   “Lisbon	   provisions”	   on	   national	   parliaments	   which	   foresee	   a	  certain	   degree	   of	   inter-­‐parliamentary	   cooperation,	   especially	   in	   the	   context	   of	  multi-­‐coloured	  cards.	  	  Methodologically,	   this	   paper	   builds	   primarily	   on	   a	   series	   of	   semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  conducted	  with	  NPRs	  from	  20	  Member	  States.3	  This	  information	  has	  been	   supplemented	   by	   interviews	   with	   other	   parliamentary	   officials	   working	  within	  national	  parliaments	  and	  questionnaires	  submitted	  to	  experts	  working	  on	  national	   parliaments.4	  Moreover	   interviews	  have	  been	   conducted	  with	  officials	  working	   for	   the	   COSAC	   Secretariat.	   In	   sum,	   these	   interviews	   have	   been	  conducted	  during	   the	  period	  of	  September	  2010	  until	   January	  2015.	  By	  way	  of	  this	   data	   collection	   all	   EU	  Member	   States	   have	   been	   covered	   at	   least	   to	   some	  extent.	   Moreover	   the	   empirical	   conclusions	   and	   their	   conceptualization	   have	  been	  discussed	  at	  a	  so-­‐called	  “Monday	  Morning	  Meeting”	  of	  the	  NPRs	  to	  confirm	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  insights.5	  	  	  Against	   this	   background,	   this	   paper	   is	   set	   up	   as	   follows:	   After	   examining	   the	  main	  changes	  of	  the	  Lisbon	  Treaty	  and	  its	  implications	  for	  national	  parliaments,	  we	   develop	   a	   conceptual	   framework	   by	   bringing	   together	   the	   more	   general	  literature	  on	  parliamentary	  officials	  with	  the	  literature	  on	  networking	  of	  officials	  within	  the	  system	  of	  EU	  multi-­‐level	  governance.	  We	  then	  probe	  into	  the	  rationale	  and	   tasks	   of	   the	   network	   of	   national	   parliamentary	   representatives	   and	   put	   it	  into	  context	  by	  comparing	  it	  to	  other	  forms	  of	  inter-­‐parliamentary	  bureaucratic	  cooperation	  that	  involve	  officials	  such	  as	  the	  COSAC	  Secretariat.	  	  	  
1.	  Powers	  of	  parliamentary	  control	  after	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Lisbon	  	  The	   Lisbon	   Treaty	   upgrades	   the	   role	   of	   national	   parliaments	   within	   the	  European	  legal	  order.	  	  First,	   the	   information	   rights	   of	   national	   parliaments	   are	   strengthened	   with	  regard	  to	  legislative	  documents.	  This	  is	  a	  step	  forward	  for	  those	  parliaments	  that	  
                                                3	  The	  questions	  asked	  ranged	  from	  the	  daily	  tasks	  that	  the	  respective	  NPRs	  fulfill	  to	  how	  they	  keep	  in	  touch	  with	   their	   respective	   national	   legislature,	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   regular	  meetings	   of	   NPRs	   (Monday	  Morning	  meetings),	   the	  system	  of	  parliamentary	  scrutiny	  of	   the	  respective	  Member	  States	  and	  the	   implications	   for	  staff.	  4	   These	   questionnaires	   were	   filled	   in	   by	   country	   experts	   as	   part	   of	   the	   OPAL	   Country	   Reports.	   They	  contained	  data	  on	  the	  date	  when	  the	  NPRs	  were	  established	  and	  the	  legal	  rules	  concerning	  NPRs.	  This	  data	  covers	  all	  EU	  Member	  States.	  5	  This	  meeting	  took	  place	  on	  6th	  May	  2013.	  Another	  presentation	  on	  the	  use	  of	  the	  Lisbon	  provisions	  by	  national	  parliaments	  was	  given	  to	  the	  representatives	  of	  national	  parliaments	  in	  Brussels	  in	  December	  2014.	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were	   previously	   dependent	   on	   their	   respective	   governments	   to	   provide	   them	  with	  information	  on	  EU	  affairs.	  A	  novelty	  of	  the	  Lisbon	  Treaty,	  that	  has	  received	  substantial	  academic	  attention	  (Hefftler	  et.al.	  2015)	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  subsidiarity	  is	  to	   be	   ensured	   through	   a	  mechanism,	  which	   is	   commonly	   referred	   to	   as	   ‘Early	  Warning	  Mechanism’	  (Rothenberger	  and	  Vogt	  2007).	  	  	  Accordingly	   any	   national	   parliament	   or	   any	   chamber	   of	   a	   national	   parliament	  may,	  within	  8	  weeks	  from	  the	  date	  of	  transmission	  of	  a	  legislative	  act	  send	  to	  the	  Presidents	  of	  the	  EP,	  the	  Council	  and	  the	  Commission	  a	  reasoned	  opinion	  stating	  why	  it	  considers	  that	  the	  draft	  in	  question	  does	  not	  comply	  with	  the	  principle	  of	  subsidiarity.	  Each	  national	  parliament	  has	  two	  votes	  and	  in	  the	  case	  of	  bicameral	  systems,	  each	  of	  the	  two	  chambers	  has	  one	  vote.	  In	  this	  context	  two	  procedures	  commonly	  referred	  to	  as	   ‘yellow	  and	  orange	  cards	  procedures’	   form	  one	  of	   the	  cornerstones	  of	  the	  Treaty	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  parliamentary	  control.	  The	  'yellow'	  card	   procedure	   consists	   of	   the	   following:	   where	   reasoned	   opinions	   on	   a	   non-­‐compliance	  of	  a	  draft	   legislative	  act	  with	  the	  principle	  of	  subsidiarity	  represent	  at	  least	  one	  third	  of	  all	  the	  votes	  allocated	  to	  national	  parliaments,	  the	  draft	  must	  be	   reviewed.6	   After	   such	   review,	   the	   institution	   that	   has	   put	   forward	   the	  proposal	  may	  decide	   to	  maintain,	  amend	  or	  withdraw	  the	  draft.	   In	   this	  context	  reasons	  must	  be	  given	  for	  whichever	  decision	  is	  taken.	  	  	  The	  'orange'	  card	  procedure	  states	  that	  under	  the	  ordinary	  legislative	  procedure	  the	   draft	   legislative	   act	   must	   be	   reviewed	   if	   the	   reasoned	   opinions	   regarding	  subsidiarity	  represent	  at	  least	  a	  simple	  majority	  of	  the	  votes	  allocated	  to	  national	  parliaments.	  After	   this	  review,	   the	  Commission	  may	  decide	   to	  maintain,	  amend	  or	  withdraw	  the	  proposal	  (Christiansen	  et	  al.	  2013;	  Kiiver	  2012).	  However,	  if,	  by	  a	  majority	  of	  55%	  of	  the	  members	  of	  the	  Council	  or	  a	  simple	  majority	  of	  the	  votes	  cast	   in	   the	   EP,	   the	   legislators	   are	   of	   the	   opinion	   that	   the	   proposal	   does	   not	  comply	  with	  the	  principle	  of	  subsidiarity,	  no	  further	  consideration	  shall	  be	  given	  to	  it	  (COSAC	  2008).	  	  	  Moreover	  national	  parliaments	  can	  participate	  in	  the	  request	  for	  filing	  an	  action	  for	  annulment	  before	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  on	  grounds	  of	  a	  breach	   of	   the	   principle	   of	   subsidiarity.	   Finally,	   it	   is	   foreseen	   that	   national	  parliaments	   are	   to	   play	   a	   role	   in	   the	   inter-­‐parliamentary	   cooperation	   between	  national	  Parliaments	  and	  with	  the	  European	  Parliament	  (Kiiver	  2012).	  	  
                                                6	  If	  the	  draft	  legislative	  act	  is	  about	  the	  area	  of	  freedom,	  security	  and	  justice	  (Article	  76	  TFEU),	  this	  threshold	  shall	  be	  1⁄4.	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  Due	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   thresholds	   for	   the	   ‘cards’	   under	   the	   Early	   Warning	  Mechanism	   are	   high	   and	   the	   deadlines	   are	   tight,	   there	   has	   to	   be	   some	  coordination	  among	  national	   legislatures	   in	  order	   to	  be	  able	   to	  have	  an	   impact	  under	  the	  EWM.	  This	  includes	  the	  communication	  of	  the	  priorities	  of	  individual	  parliaments	  and	  the	  attempt	  to	  identify	  issues	  that	  are	  of	  a	  common	  concern	  for	  a	   larger	   number	   of	   parliaments.	   This	   is	   where	   the	   inter-­‐parliamentary	  cooperation	  of	  officials	  could	  play	  a	  crucial	  role.	  	  
2.	  Analytical	  framework	  	  While	  we	  can	  build	  on	  a	  growing	  host	  of	  literature	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  way	  that	  national	   parliaments	   hold	   the	   executive	   to	   account	   in	   EU	   affairs	   (Maurer	   and	  Wessels	  2001;	  Raunio	  and	  O’Brennan	  2007,	  Hefftler	  et.al.	  2015),	  the	  literature	  on	  parliamentary	   administrations	   in	   EU	   Member	   States	   is	   thus-­‐far	   mainly	  descriptive	  and	  rather	  limited	  in	  scope.	  The	  main	  insights	  relate	  to	  the	  political	  neutrality	   of	   administrators	   for	   example	   in	   French	   system	   and	   in	   the	   British	  parliamentary	  administrative	  system	  (Baron	  2013;	  Campbell	  and	  Laporte	  1981;	  Perez	  2007;	  Ryle	  1981).	  	  	  	  There	   is	   a	   growing	   debate	   on	   the	   role	   of	   non-­‐elected	   officials	   in	   the	   European	  Parliament	  after	  the	  Lisbon	  Treaty	  (eg.	  Egeberg	  et.al.	  2013;	  Neuhold	  and	  Dobbels	  in	   this	   volume;	   Winzen	   2011)	   but	   the	   scholarly	   debate	   on	   role	   of	   officials	   in	  national	  parliaments	  is	  still	  very	  much	  in	  its	  infancy.	  Notable	  exceptions	  include	  Christiansen,	   Högenauer	   and	   Neuhold	   (2013)	   and	   Winzen	   (2015).	   While	  Christiansen	   et.al.	   (2013),	   raise	   the	   question	   whether	   the	   extension	   of	   the	  powers	  of	  national	  parliaments	  might	  empower	  bureaucrats	  rather	  than	  elected	  members	  of	   parliament,	  Winzen	  proposes	   a	   so-­‐called	   “delegation	   approach”	   as	  an	   appropriate	   angle	   to	   study	   legislative-­‐administrative	   relations.	   Accordingly,	  he	   argues	   that	   “parliamentarians	   successfully	   delegate	   to	   bureaucrats,	   making	  bureaucratic	   growth	   a	   successful	   strategy	   to	   strengthen	   the	   parliament”	  (Winzen,	   2014).	   Although	   bureaucrats	   have	   preferences	   and	   agendas	   of	   their	  own,	   it	   is	   unclear	   whether	   political	   and	   administrative	   agendas	   overlap	   or,	  whether	  they	  are	  in	  fact	  even	  different	  (Winzen,	  2014).	  	  When	   trying	   to	   study	   inter-­‐parliamentary	   cooperation	   between	   parliamentary	  officials,	  and	  in	  this	  context	  especially	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  network	  of	  NPRs,	  it	   is	   instructive	   to	  build	  on	   conceptualisations	  of	  networking	  of	  officials	  within	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the	  EU	  system	  in	  the	  literature	  more	  generally.	  	  Networking	   of	   parliamentary	   officials	   across	   Member	   State	   borders	   has,	  however,	   thus-­‐far	   been	   eclipsed	   by	   systematic	   scholarly	   analysis,	   possibly	  because	   it	   is	   a	   recent	   phenomenon.	   However,	   the	   concept	   of	   epistemic	  communities	  is	  instructive	  in	  this	  context,	  as	  it	  has	  been	  developed	  in	  the	  context	  of	  officials	  engaging	  in	  international	  policy	  coordination.	  Epistemic	  communities	  have	   been	   described	   as	   a	   ‘network	   of	   professionals	   with	   recognized	   expertise	  and	   competence	   in	   a	   particular	   domain	   and	   an	   authoritative	   claim	   to	   policy-­‐relevant	   knowledge	  within	   that	   domain’	   (Haas	   1992:	   3).	  What	   is	   crucial	   is	   the	  fact	  that	  the	  professionals	  making	  up	  epistemic	  communities	  have	  a	  shared	  set	  of	  normative	  and	  principled	  beliefs,	  shared	  notions	  of	  validity	  and	  a	  set	  of	  common	  practices	   associated	   with	   a	   set	   of	   problems	   and	   policy	   issues	   (Haas	   1992:	   5;	  Clemens	  and	  Cook	  1999:	  446).	  	  	  When	   applying	   this	   to	   the	   EU,	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   role	   of	   government	  representatives	   in	   EU	   Treaty	   reform,	   Reh	   adds	   to	   these	   dimensions	   issue-­‐relevant	   expertise,	   experience	   in	   negotiating	   internationally	   and	   effective	  preparation,	   including	   access	   to	   information	   on	   on-­‐going	   negotiations	   (Reh	  2007:	  1189).	  Richardson	  points	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  these	  epistemic	  communities	  are	  important	   in	   the	   EU	   exactly	   because	   they	   so	   “often	   transcend	   national	  boundaries”.	   The	   policy	   community/policy	   network	   approach	   can	   in	   contrast	  enhance	  our	  understanding	  of	   the	  ways	   in	  which	  agenda	   issues	  are	  channelled	  into	   legislative	   proposals–	   especially	   areas	   of	   ‘low	  politics’	   that	   are	   of	   a	   highly	  technical	  nature	  (Richardson,	  2006:	  6).	  	  	  However,	  within	  epistemic	  communities	   its	  members	  often	   ‘go	  native’,	   i.e.	   their	  actions	   are	   no	   longer	   exclusively	   determined	   by	   their	   principals,	   but	   also	   by	   a	  feeling	  of	  solidarity	  with	  the	  group.	   	  In	  the	  EU	  context,	  this	  phenomenon	  has	  so	  far	  mainly	  been	  identified	  with	  regard	  to	  government	  officials	  in	  Council	  working	  groups.	  Regular	  meetings	  between	  government	  officials	  are	  seen	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	   development	   of	   a	   high	   degree	   of	   collegiality	   and	   collective	   identity	   among	  officials	   (e.g.	   Juncos	  and	  Pomorska	  2011).	  Beyers	  and	  Dierickx	   (1998)	   contend	  that	  nationality	  –	  while	  remaining	  important	  in	  many	  respects	  –	  is	  diluted	  in	  the	  Council	   as	   a	   supranational	   network	   develops	   in	   juxtaposition	   to	   the	  intergovernmental	   characteristics	   of	   agents.	   In	   the	   context	   of	   the	   Council	   of	  Europe,	  Checkel	  has	  also	  found	  that	  social	  agents	  go	  ‘native’	  (2003).	  A	  sign	  of	  an	  epistemic	   community	   is	   when	   officials	   start	   to	   moderate	   their	   mandates	   or	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develop	  codes	   to	  signal	  disagreement	  with	   their	  official	  mandate	   to	   their	  peers	  on	   the	   international	   level	   (cf.	   Juncos	   and	  Pomorska	  2011;	  Beyers	   and	  Dierickx	  1998;	  Checkel	  2003).	  	  	  This,	   as	   alluded	   to	   before,	   raises	   interesting	   questions	   as	   regards	   to	   officials	  operating	   within	   trans-­‐national	   bureaucratic	   networks:	   do	   they	   develop	   a	  collective	  “European”	  identity”	  and	  as	  such	  moderate	  their	  national	  “position”	  or	  actually	   remain	   representatives	   of	   “their”	   respective	   national	   parliament	   in	  Brussels?	  In	  order	  to	  be	  able	  to	  answer	  this	  question	  we	  need	  to	  shed	  light	  on	  the	  forms	   of	   bureaucratic	   networks	   prevalent	   at	   the	   EU	   level	   that	   bring	   together	  parliamentary	  actors.	  	  	  
3.	   The	   network	   of	   national	   parliamentary	   representatives:	   rationale	   and	  
tasks	  
	  
3.a.	  The	  development	  of	  the	  network	  of	  NPRs	  over	  time	  	  The	  network	  of	  NPRs	  started	   in	   the	  early	  1990s	  but	  was	   initially	   slow	  to	  grow	  from	   one	   representative	   to	   include	   representatives	   from	   all	   member	   states	  parliaments.7	  The	  Danish	  parliament	  was	  the	   forerunner,	  having	  already	  sent	  a	  parliamentary	  representative	  to	  Brussels	  since	  1991.8	  It	  was	  the	  first	  legislature	  to	  deal	  with	  EU	  issues	  quite	  intensively	  through	  the	  mandating	  of	  the	  respective	  minister	   in	   the	  Council,	   so	   this	  delegation	  of	   a	  parliamentary	   representative	   to	  Brussels	   ‘came	   rather	   naturally’	   (Interview	   IV).	   Note	   that	   this	   parliamentary	  representative	  was	  thus	  sent	  to	  the	  European	  level	  in	  order	  to	  be	  able	  to	  develop	  a	  parliamentary	  stance	  and	  position	  independent	  from	  the	  Danish	  government.	  	  The	   Finnish	   parliament	   followed	   in	   1995	   in	   the	   same	   vein;	   in	   order	   to	   obtain	  first-­‐hand	   information	   not	   provided	   by	   the	   executive	   (Interview	   VII).	   Italy	  followed	  suit	   in	  1998	  with	  an	  NPR	  who	  commuted	  from	  the	  Italian	  capital.	  The	  UK	  House	  of	  Commons	  delegated	  a	  representative	  the	  year	  after.	  	  A	   big	   influx	   only	   took	   place	   prior	   to	   and	   after	   enlargement	   (2003-­‐2005).	   This	  ‘boom’	  was	  only	  partially	  related	  to	  enlargement	  in	  included	  also	  ‘older’	  Member	  States	   such	   as	   Germany,	   Greece,	   Belgium,	   the	   Netherlands	   and	   Austria	   (lower	  chamber).	   The	   last	   Member	   States	   that	   sent	   a	   representative	   were	   Malta	   and	  
                                                7	  While	  at	  a	  given	  point	  in	  time	  (for	  example	  Bulgaria	  and	  Slovakia	  do	  not	  have	  a	  representative)	  not	  all	  positions	  are	  filled,	  this	  is	  temporary.	  8	  The	  Danish	  NPR	  was	  at	  this	  point	  however	  based	  at	  the	  Belgian	  Chamber	  of	  Representatives.	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Croatia	   in	   2012-­‐2013	   respectively.	   Even	   Norway	   is	   sending	   a	   representative	  since	  the	  beginning	  of	  2013.	  	  	  Thus,	  the	  network	  has	  grown	  even	  in	  times	  of	  financial	  crisis,	  where	  one	  might	  assume	   that	   administrative	   cost	   would	   be	   reduced.	   This	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   a	  reflection	  of	   its	   perceived	  value	   added.	   In	   fact,	   the	  House	  of	   Lords	   is	   currently	  considering	  a	  recommendation	  from	  the	  UK	  government	  to	  increase	  the	  number	  of	  British	  NPRs	  in	  Brussels	  before	  the	  next	  British	  Council	  Presidency	  (House	  of	  Lords,	  2014)	  and	  the	  Dutch	  parliament	  has	  recently	  decided	  to	  appoint	  two	  NPRs	  instead	  of	  one	  (Interview	  XXIV).	  	  
Figure	  1:	   The	  Total	  Number	  of	  NPRs	  per	  Year	   (including	  both	  Upper	   and	  
Lower	  Houses)	  
	  	  	  















































































	  As	  systems	  of	  parliamentary	  control	  are	  not	  only	  rather	  complex	  but	  have	  their	  unique	  ways	  of	  functioning	  (O’Brennan	  and	  Raunio	  2007),	  it	  is	  key	  that	  an	  NPR	  is	  very	  much	  aware	  of	  how	  the	  respective	  political	  system	  works	  and	  which	  players	  are	  responsible	  for	  which	  type	  of	  issues	  at	  which	  stage	  of	  the	  policy-­‐process:	  Is	  the	   sectoral	   committee	   or	   the	   European	   affairs	   committee	   in	   charge?	   If	   the	  plenary	  has	  to	  take	  the	  final	  decision,	  the	  scrutiny	  process	  takes	  longer	  and	  the	  NPR	   needs	   to	   factor	   that	   in.	   The	   Dutch	   and	   Danish	   NPR,	   for	   example,	   tend	   to	  update	   the	   relevant	   committees	   regularly	  when	   the	   parliament	   is	   aiming	   for	   a	  yellow	  card	  (Interviews	  XXV	  and	  XXVI).	  	  A	   large	   number	   of	   NPRs,	   such	   as	   the	   Spanish,	   Italian,	   Portuguese,	   Austrian,	  Swedish,	  Finnish,	  Danish,	  Dutch	  and	  the	  representatives	  of	   the	  French	  National	  Assembly	  and	  of	  the	  UK	  House	  of	  Commons	  maintain	  their	  ties	  by	  going	  back	  to	  ‘their’	   Member	   State	   parliament	   around	   once	   a	   month	   primarily	   with	   the	  objective	  of	   information	  exchange;	   conveying	  developments	   from	  the	  EU	  arena	  to	  the	  national	  level	  and	  vice	  versa.	  In	  this	  context	  NPRs	  attend	  staff	  meetings	  of	  officials	  working	  for	  sectoral	  committees	  and	  the	  EAC	  and	  provide	  reports	  on	  EU	  affairs.	   For	   example	   the	  NPR	  of	   the	  House	  of	  Commons	  writes	   a	  weekly	  policy	  briefing	   for	   the	   EU	   Scrutiny	   Committee	   of	   the	   House	   of	   Commons	   (Interview	  XXI).	  	  	  Several	   NPRs	   describe	   their	   respective	   committee	   responsible	   for	   European	  Affairs	   (and	  where	   relevant	   the	   Secretariat	   General)	   as	   their	   ‘main	   or	   primary	  clients’	   they	  have	  to	  see	  at	  regular	   intervals	  (Interview	  XV	  and	  Interview	  XVII).	  There	  is	  a	  trend,	  however,	  that	   in	  Member	  States	  that	  have	  joined	  the	  EU	  more	  recently	   this	   direct	   ‘relay	   function’	   has	   been	   reduced	   or	   replaced	   with	   other	  means	   of	   communication.	   After	   assuming	   her	   function	   in	   2008,	   the	   Lithuanian	  NPR	  initially	  went	  back	  home	  every	  six	  months	  for	  example.	  After	  the	  Eurozone	  crisis,	  most	  of	  the	  contacts	  now	  take	  place	  via	  email,	  phone	  and	  videoconference.	  The	  permanent	  representative	  of	  the	  Polish	  Sejm	  seldom	  goes	  back	  to	  the	  Polish	  parliament	   and	   keeps	   in	   touch	  mainly	   via	   email	   (Interview	   XVI	   and	   Interview	  XVII).	  	  	  In	  general,	  the	  socialization	  in	  the	  home	  parliament	  is	  strong,	  with	  the	  effect	  that	  the	  NPRs	   form	  a	   group	  marked	  primarily	   by	  national	   ties	   and	  mandates.	  Most	  NPRs	   are	   recalled	   after	   a	   few	   years	   and	   keep	   their	   allegiance	   to	   their	   sending	  institution,	   i.e.	   their	   principal,	   as	   their	   career	   prospects	   are	   determined	  by	   the	  
10	  	  
perception	  of	  their	  performance	  by	  national	  actors.	  	  	  
3.c.	  Key	  tasks:	  information	  exchange	  and	  representation?	  	  In	  addition	  to	  their	  close	  ties	  to	  their	  respective	  parliaments,	  the	  neutrality	  of	  the	  NPRs	  and	   their	  non-­‐partisan	  role	  as	  well	  as	   the	   importance	  of	  a	  mandate	   from	  their	   respective	   parliament/committee	   is	   stressed	   time	   and	   time	   again	  (Interview	   I,	   Interview	   XX,	   Interview	   XV,	   Interview	   XI,	   Interview	   XXII).	   Thus,	  instead	   of	   developing	   a	   set	   of	   joint	   beliefs	   and	   common	   views	   on	   substantive	  issues,	  as	  suggested	  by	  the	  concept	  of	  an	  epistemic	  community,	  NPRs	  are	  usually	  requested	  not	  to	  engage	  in	  substantive	  debates.	  Also	  in	  practice,	  they	  try	  not	  to	  interpret	  the	  content	  of	  their	  parliament’s	  positions.	  One	  official	  (Interview	  XX)	  brings	  it	  to	  the	  point	  by	  saying:	  
What	  you	  have	  to	  realize	  we	  are	  civil	  servants.	  I	  have	  a	  permanent	  position	  
and	  I	  passed	  a	  Concours.	  I	  work	  for	  any	  political	  group	  and	  I	  am	  part	  of	  the	  
staff	  of	  parliament;	  working	  for	  the	  house.	  […]	  We	  deal	  with	  technical	  issues	  
and	  we	  do	  not	  pre-­cook	  any	  issues	  in	  any	  way.	  	  	  NPRs	   thus	   tend	   to	   act	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   formal	   “mandates”	   or	   parliamentary	  positions,	   such	   as	   parliamentary	   or	   committee	   resolutions,	   opinions	   and	   are	  cautious	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  interpreting	  content	  (Interview	  XX,	  Monday	  Morning	  Meeting,	   6	  May	   2013).	   Rather,	   the	   core	   task	   is	   to	   	   “build	   networks,	   especially	  with	  other	  parliaments	  and	  to	  find	  out	  what	  they	  do	  and	  alert	  them	  to	  what	  we	  do”	  (Interview	  XXIV).	  	  Thus,	   the	   close	   ties	   with	   the	   sending	   institution	   in	   combination	   with	   the	  reluctance	  to	  engage	  in	  substantive	  debates	  has	  a	  three-­‐fold	  effect	  on	  the	  role	  of	  NPRs:	  	  NPRs	   maintain	   close	   contacts	   within	   the	   respective	   legislature	   as	   information	  brokers:	   representatives	   set	   up	   their	   ‘own	   channels’	   they	   can	   tap	   into	   when	  requiring	   information	   on	   specific,	   sectoral	   issues,	   but	   also	   have	   first-­‐hand	  information	   on	   subsidiarity	   checks.	   Their	   function	   is	   being	   described	   as	   being	  the	   ‘eyes,	   ears	   and	   mouth’	   for	   their	   respective	   parliament”	   and	   as	   such	   to	  function	   as	   an	   ‘information-­‐relay’	   or	   ‘information-­‐broker’	   for	   their	   respective	  legislature	  (Interview	  X,	  Interview	  XVI,	   	  Interview	  XXIII,	  Interview	  XV;	  Bill	  Cash	  2013).9	  The	  familiarity	  of	  NPRs	  both	  with	  staff	  and	  members	  of	  parliament	  also	  ensures	   a	   high	   degree	   of	   trust	   and	   familiarity	   and	   enables	   them	   to	   adopt	   a	  
                                                9	  Bill	  Cash,	  Open	  Lectures,	  House	  of	  Commons,	  London,	  21	  February	  2013.	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parliamentary	   stance	   and	   position	   on	   EU	   affairs	   (Interview	   XV	   and	   Interview	  XVII).	  	  Due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  NPRs	  are	  all	  located	  on	  the	  same	  corridor	  of	  the	  EP	  (except	  for	  the	  German	  delegation	  and	  the	  Belgian	  NPRs)	  10,	  they	  are	  in	  a	  perfect	  position	  to	   gather	   more	   informal	   insights	   about	   the	   stance	   about	   respective	   issues	   in	  other	   parliaments	   or	   as	   regards	   to	   developments	   on	   the	   EU	   level	   (Interview	  XXVI).	   If	   one	   is	   in	   need	   of	   specific	   information	   or	   the	   position	   of	   a	   respective	  legislature	  on	  a	  specific	  issue	  ‘you	  just	  go	  down	  the	  hall.’	  	  (Interview	  XVI).	  	  The	   second	   –	   and	   related	   –	   task	   of	   the	   NPRs	   is	   to	   assist	   their	   respective	  parliaments	   in	   exercising	   democratic	   control	   (Interview	   XV).	   This	   not	   only	  implies	   the	   forwarding	  of	   information,	  but	  also	   that	  NPRs	  assume	  a	  key	  role	   in	  
information-­processing,	   i.e.	   identifying	   and	   framing	   what	   could	   be	   relevant	   for	  the	   respective	   national	   parliament.	   The	   Commission	   sends	   a	   plethora	   of	  documents	   to	  parliaments	  under	   the	  Barroso	   initiative	  and	  NPRs	   contribute	   to	  the	  identification	  of	  issues	  that	  are	  to	  be	  subject	  to	  parliamentary	  control.	  In	  this	  quest,	   information	   has	   to	   be	   ‘tailor-­made	   to	   parliament’s	   needs’	   and	   needs	   to	  show	  an	  awareness	  of	  the	  priorities	  of	  the	  parliament	  (Interview	  XXIII;	  Pinheiro	  2012:	   212).	   The	   governments	   also	   provide	   information	   ‘but	   you	   hear	   and	   see	  
more	  when	  you	  are	  in	  Brussels’	  (Interview	  X).	  In	  parliaments	  that	  select	  priority	  dossiers	   for	   scrutiny,	   it	   is	   the	   NPR	   that	   keeps	   bilateral	   contacts	   with	   sectoral	  committees	  and	  steers	  and	  assists	  them	  in	  the	  selection	  of	  priority	  dossiers	   for	  parliamentary	  scrutiny	  (President	  of	  the	  Portuguese	  Parliament	  2008).	  	  	  In	   addition,	   the	   task	   of	  NPRs	   is	   to	   alert	   their	   parliament	   to	   the	   general	   stance	  taken	   by	   national	   parliaments	   on	   a	   specific	   dossier,	   especially	  when	   a	   greater	  number	  of	  parliaments	  are	  starting	  to	  discuss	  the	  adoption	  of	  reasoned	  opinions	  on	  a	  certain	   issue.	  The	  Danish	  NPR,	   for	  example,	   informs	  his	  parliaments	  of	  all	  reasoned	   opinions	   submitted	   by	   other	   parliaments	   long	   before	   they	   are	  published	   on	   the	   official	   database	   IPEX	   (Interview	  XXV,	   also	   XXVII).	   Especially	  under	   the	   Early	  Warning	   System,	  where	   parliaments	   are	   actually	   aware	   that	   a	  minimum	  number	  of	   opinions	  has	   to	   be	   reached,	   there	   is	   a	   ‘bandwagon	   effect’	  that	  gains	  momentum	  in	  the	  final	  weeks.	  By	  keeping	  their	  parliaments	  abreast	  of	  
                                                10	   The	  German	   delegation	   is	   unique	   in	   that	   it	   has	   two	   dimensions:	   an	   administrative	   dimension	   and	   one	  where	  the	  Political	  Party	  Groups	  are	  represented	  and	  due	  to	   its	  size	   it	  uses	  office	  space	  outside	  of	   the	  EP	  (Interview	  XIV).	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such	   dynamics	   and	   of	   the	   objections	   of	   other	   parliaments,	   NPRs	   can	   to	   some	  extent	  frame	  their	  parliament’s	  agenda	  (Interview	  XXIV,	  XXV,	  XXVI).	  	  	  NPRs	  also	  act	   as	  platform	  of	   information	  exchange	  across	  national	  parliaments	  not	   only	   to	   coordinate	   multi-­‐coloured	   cards	   but	   as	   a	   forum	   to	   exchange	   best	  practices	  of	  parliamentary	  control.	  In	  this	  vein	  they	  exchange	  views	  for	  example	  on	  how	  the	  system	  of	  mandating	  the	  executive	  works	  in	  certain	  Member	  States	  in	  order	  for	  national	  parliaments	  to	  enhance	  their	  scrutiny	  systems.11	  	  	  Thirdly,	  the	  work	  of	  the	  NPRs	  also	  has	  an	  important	  ‘European’	  dimension	  and	  as	  such	   contacts	   to	   the	   three	  main	   institutions	   involved	   in	   EU	   policy-­‐making	   are	  seen	  as	  crucial	  (Pinheiro	  2010).	  The	  link	  to	  the	  EP	  and	  the	  political	  dialogue	  with	  the	   Commission	   are	   highlighted	   as	   being	   vital	   in	   this	   respect.	   Even	   from	   a	  logistical	  perspective	  there	  is	  a	  direct	  link	  to	  the	  EP	  as	  NPRs	  are	  based	  within	  the	  premises	   of	   the	   EP.	   The	   network	  with	   the	   Commission	   spans	   all	   layers	   of	   the	  European	   executive	   centre	   (Bauer	   2008);	   European	   Commission	   officials,	   the	  Secretariat	   General	   of	   the	   Commission,	   cabinet	   members	   and	   Commissioners.	  The	   latter	   are	   interested	   ‘in	   us	   NPRs	   and	   see	   us	   as	   a	   new	   phenomenon’	  (Interview	  XVIII).	  	  This	  is	  manifested	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  not	  only	  representatives	  of	  the	   services	   of	   the	   Commission	   but	   also	   Commissioners	   themselves	   attend	   the	  meetings	  of	  NPRs	  (Interview	  V).	  The	  duration	  of	  the	  Monday	  Morning	  Meetings	  of	  the	  NPRs	  has	  thus	  risen	  from	  a	  few	  minutes	  in	  2008	  to	  2-­‐3	  hours	  in	  2014,	  as	  the	  NPRs	  are	  now	  inviting	  Commission	  officials	  and	  –	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent	  –	  Council	  representatives	  (Estonian	  NPR,	  31	  March	  2014).	  	  	  Moreover	   parliamentary	   representatives	   ensure	   cooperation	   with	   their	  respective	   Permanent	   Representation	   to	   the	   European	   Union	   and	   try	   to	  systematise	   these	   contacts	   (Interview	   XXI).	   Contacts	   to	   the	   Conference	   of	  Parliamentary	  Committees	  for	  Union	  Affairs	  (COSAC)	  as	  a	  political	  coordinating	  forum	  of	  the	  position	  of	  national	  parliaments	  (Interview	  IV)	  are	  simplified	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  COSAC	  is	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  located	  within	  the	  same	  building	  as	  the	  NPRs;	  attends	  the	  regular	  meetings	  of	  the	  NPRs	  and	  NPRs	  are	  part	  of	  COSAC	  during	  the	  period	  of	  the	  Troika.	  	  	  COSAC,	   as	   explained	   further	   below,	   is	   thus	   seen	   as	   an	   internal	   rather	   than	  external	  partner,	  with	  NPRs	  being	  seen	  as	  an	   ‘excellent	  source	  of	   information	  of	  
                                                11	  See	  for	  example	  the	  Seminar	  Engaging	  with	  Europe:	  Parliamentary	  Control	  in	  EU	  Affairs,	  Organised	  by	  the	  	  Dutch	  Parliamentary	  Representation	  in	  Brussels,	  11th	  December	  2014.	  This	  Seminar	  was	  pre-­‐ceeded	  by	  a	  session	  between	  academics	  and	  NPRs	  to	  discuss	  practices	  of	  parliamentary	  control.	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what	   is	   actually	   going	   on	   in	   national	   parliaments’	   (Interview	   V).	   In	   this	   quest	  NPRs	   are	   described	   as	   a	   “bridge	   between	   Brussels	   and	   the	   parliaments	   in	   the	  
capitals”	  (Interview	  XXVIIII).	  
	  NPRs	  are	  also	  playing	  a	  role	  in	  reflecting	  on	  a	  possible	  reform	  of	  COSAC	  meetings	  themselves	   in	   order	   to	   enhance	   parliamentary	   influence.	   Currently	   there	   are	  discussions	  on	  developing	  COSAC	  meetings	  “new	  style”,	  along	  the	  following	  lines:	  more	   discussion	   of	   substance	   for	   example	   of	   certain	   policy-­‐dossiers,	   more	  opportunities	   for	   informal	   exchange	   between	   MPs	   and	   staff	   and	   more	  possibilities	   for	   the	   influence	   of	   the	   agenda	   by	   other	   parliaments	   than	   that	  holding	   the	  Presidency	   (Mastenbroek	  et.al.	   2014).	   These	   issues	  were	   inter	   alia	  discussed	  between	  NPRs	  and	  representatives	  of	  the	  COSAC	  Secretariat.	  	  	  	  However,	  despite	  these	  contacts	  to	  the	  EU	  institutions	  such	  as	  the	  Commission,	  the	   representative	   function	   of	   NPRs	   towards	   these	   bodies	   is	   rather	  weak.	   The	  main	  aim	  of	  encounters	  with	  Commission	  or	  Council	  representatives	  tends	  to	  be	  directed	   towards	   information-­‐gathering	   rather	   than	   the	   representation	   of	   a	  legislative	  position	  (Interview	  XXIV).	  	  	  When	   NPRs	   are	   involved	   in	   the	   representation	   of	   national	   parliaments	   at	   the	  European	   level,	   this	   is	  mostly	   in	   a	   supporting	   function.	  On	   the	   one	  hand	  NPRs	  provide	  support	  to	  their	  parliamentary	  President	  and	  to	  the	  delegations	  of	  their	  respective	   parliament	   when	   attending	   meetings	   of	   the	   EU	   institutions	   and	  collaborate	   in	   the	   organisation	   and	   following-­‐up	   of	   work-­‐	   and	   study	   visits	   by	  Members	  and	  parliamentary	  officials	  to	  the	  European	  institutions	  (Interview	  XXI,	  Interview	   X).	   On	   the	   other	   the	   ‘relay	   function’	   as	   regards	   their	   national	  legislature	   also	   implies	   that	   NPRs	   accompany	   EU	   representatives	   such	   as	   the	  President	  of	  the	  EP	  or	  Commissioners	  when	  visiting	  their	  respective	  parliament	  and	  attending	  plenary	  or	  committee	  meetings	  (Interview	  XVII,	  Interview	  XV).	  	  
	  
4.	   Putting	   the	   role	   of	   NPRS	   into	   context:	   a	   comparison	   to	   other	  
“parliamentary	  trans-­national	  bureaucratic	  networks”	  
	  
4.1.	  The	  COSAC	  Secretariat	  
	  Note	   that	   the	   COSAC	   secretariat	   has	   inter	   alia	   been	   set	   up	   to	   promote	   inter-­‐parliamentary	   cooperation.	   In	   this	   vein	   the	   COSAC	   Secretariat	   has	   its	   goal	   to	  assist	  COSAC	  in	  the	  quest	  of	  “exchange	  of	  information	  and	  best	  practice	  between	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national	   Parliaments	   and	   the	   European	   Parliament,	   including	   their	   special	  committees”.12	  	  	  COSAC	   itself,	   which	   is	   a	   Conference	   of	   the	   European	   Affairs	   committees	   of	  national	  parliaments	  of	   as	  well	   as	   representatives	  of	   the	  European	  Parliament,	  was	  established	   in	  May	  1989.	  According	   to	   the	  Lisbon	  Treaty,	  COSAC	  may	  also	  organise	  inter-­‐parliamentary	  conferences	  on	  specific	  topics,	  in	  particular	  within	  the	  field	  of	  common	  foreign	  and	  security	  policy	  (CFSP).	  It	  is	  noteworthy	  that	  the	  Treaty	   of	   Lisbon	   stresses	   explicitly	   that	   COSAC	   has	   a	   supporting	   role	   vis	   a	   vis	  national	   parliaments	   as	   “contributions	   from	   the	   Conference	   shall	   not	   bind	  national	  Parliaments	  and	  shall	  not	  prejudge	  their	  positions."13	  COSAC	  has	  a	  role	  in	  “show-­‐casing”	  the	   importance	  of	   the	  rotating	  Presidency	  of	  the	  EU	  as	  COSAC	  meetings	  usually	  take	  place	  in	  the	  capital	  of	  the	  Member	  State	  holding	  the	  Chair.	  	  As	  Hasters	  points	  out,	  a	  notable	  development	  in	  COSAC’s	  history	  is	  the	  set-­‐up	  of	  a	  permanent	   Secretariat	   (Hasters	   2014).	   This	   had	   been	   on	   COSACs	   agenda	  repeatedly	  and	  has	  been	  rejected	  time	  and	  time	  again;	  in	  1995,	  1997,	  and	  1999	  (COSAC,	   2013).	   The	   necessity	   for	   a	   secretariat	   grew	   as	   the	   European	   Affairs	  Committees	   (EACs)	   of	   the	   Presidency	   could	   not	   face	   the	   organisation	   of	   the	  COSAC	  meetings	   alone	   (Trodoff,	   2007,	   p.	   4).	   It	  was	   then	   in	   2003	   that	   finally	   a	  Permanent	  Secretariat	  of	  COSAC	  was	  created.	  	  When	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  composition	  of	  the	  COSAC	  Secretariat,	  the	  rules	  of	  procedure	  of	  COSAC	  clearly	  make	  a	  link	  to	  the	   EU	   rotating	   Presidency	   by	   stipulating	   that	   „the	   COSAC	   Secretariat	   shall	   be	  composed	   of	   officials	   from	   the	   Parliaments	   of	   the	   Presidential	   Troika”.14	  Moreover	  the	  COSAC	  Secretariat	   is	  to	  have	  a	  Permanent	  Member	  who	  supports	  the	  Secretariat	  in	  its	  activities“	  (ROP,	  2011,	  9.1,	  in:	  Hasters	  2014).15	  	  	  Note	  that	  the	  actual	  size	  of	  the	  COSAC	  Secretariat	  varies	  because	  although	  each	  parliament	   is	   entitled	   to	   send	   one	   representative,	   some	   national	   parliaments	  delegate	   only	   one.	   It	   is	   thus	   up	   to	   the	   relevant	   national	   parliaments	   to	   decide	  who	  they	  actually	  	  appoint	  as	  members	  of	  the	  Secretariat.	  Additionally,	  in	  some	  cases	  the	  respective	  officials	  wear	  “two	  hats”	  insofar	  as	  they	  hold	  the	  position	  of	  
                                                12	  According	  to	  Article	  10	  of	  Protocol	  (No	  1)	  on	  the	  Role	  of	  National	  Parliaments	  in	  the	  European	  Union	  of	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Lisbon.	  13	  The	  Protocol	  on	  the	  “Role	  of	  National	  Parliaments	  in	  the	  European	  Union”	  of	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Amsterdam	  for	  the	  first	  time	  recognized	  COSAC.	  It	  came	  into	  force	  1	  May	  1999.	  14	  Current	  Presidency,	  previous	  one	  and	  following	  one.	  In	  January	  2015	  this	  played	  out	  as	  follows:	  Latvia	  (Presidency	  of	  COSAC)	  has	  appointed	  2	  officials	  (one	  is	  the	  Latvian	  NPR	  and	  the	  other	  is	  a	  parliamentary	  official),	  Italy	  has	  appointed	  two	  members	  (one	  from	  each	  chamber)	  and	  Luxembourg	  has	  appointed	  one	  official.	  15	   The	   Presidential	   Troika	   refers	   to	   the	   delegation	   of	   	   NPs	   of	   the	   last,	   the	   current	   and	   the	   following	  Presidency	  as	  well	  as	  the	  European	  Parliament	  (ROP,	  2011,	  2.5).	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the	   NPR	   of	   the	   respective	   Member	   State	   and	   at	   the	   same	   time	   assume	   the	  position	   within	   the	   COSAC	   Secretariat	   at	   the	   same	   time.	   Other	   national	  parliaments	  send	  one	  official	  solely	  for	  the	  tasks	  in	  the	  Secretariat.	  This	  implies	  that	   the	  composition	  of	   the	  COSAC	  Secretariat	  not	  only	  changes	  with	  each	  new	  Presidency	  but	  also	   its	  capacities	  (Hasters	  2014).	  Moreover	  a	  representative	  of	  EP	   in	   charge	   of	   relations	   with	   national	   parliaments	   is	   represented	   in	   the	  Secretariat.	  This	  member	  changes	  on	  a	  regular	  basis	  (Interview	  XXVIIII).	  	  	  This	   position	   does	   however	   not	   compete	   with	   that	   of	   the	   Permanent	  Representative	  within	  COSAC.	   16	  Due	   to	   the	   fact	   that	  he	  or	  she	   is	  appointed	   for	  two	  years,	  with	   a	  possible	   renewal	   for	   another	   two,	   this	   representative	   can	  be	  seen	  in	  a	  key	  position,	  both	  compared	  with	  the	  other	  members	  of	  the	  Secretariat.	  The	   process	   of	   appointing	   the	   Permanent	   Member	   of	   COSAC	   is	   based	   on	   the	  COSAC	  Rules	  of	  Procedure.	  Accordingly	  the	  Permanent	  Member	  is	  appointed	  by	  the	   COSAC	   Chairpersons	   on	   the	   proposal	   of	   the	   Presidential	   Troika.	   It	   is	  noteworthy	   that	   it	   is	   a	   formal	  pre-­‐condition	   that	   the	  Permanent	  Member	   is	   an	  official	   of	   a	   national	   parliament	   (Interview	   XXVIIII).	   Moreover	   the	   Permanent	  Member	   is	   very	   often	   also	   an	   NPR	   prior	   to	   the	   appointment	   to	   the	   COSAC	  Secretariat,	  which	  is	  seen	  as	  very	  useful,	  as	  one	  permanent	  member	  of	  the	  COSAC	  Secretariat	  points	  out:	  
“I	  was	  already	  acquainted	  with	  the	  multi-­national	  Brussels'	  environment,	  the	  
multi-­faceted	   work	   required	   here,	   inter-­parliamentary	   affairs	   and	   with	  
colleagues	  from	  other	  Parliaments	  (national	  parliaments	  and	  EP)	  and	  other	  
EU	   institutions.	   I	   also	   had	   the	   opportunity	   to	   be	   a	   member	   of	   the	   COSAC	  
Secretariat	   itself17;	   of	   the	  Troika	   of	   COSAC	  and	   to	  work	   closely	  with	   its	   PM	  
and	   with	   other	   Troika	   colleagues.	   The	   fact	   that	   before	   that	   I	   had	   been	  
working	  in	  the	  European	  Affairs	  Service	  of	  a	  national	  parliament	  supporting	  
the	  Committee	  on	  EU	  affairs	  was	  also	  useful.	  “	  
	  The	   Permanent	   Representative	   assumes	   somewhat	   the	   “memory”	   of	   the	  institution	  due	   to	   the	   fact	   that	  he	  or	   she	   is	   based	   in	  Brussels	   for	   around	   three	  years	   and	   plays	   a	   key	   role	   behind	   the	   scenes	   of	   COSAC.	   As	   such	   the	  representative	  obtains	  a	  comprehensive	  comparative	  overview	  of	  the	  actual	  role	  different	  national	  parliaments	  assume	  in	  the	  scrutiny	  of	  EU	  affairs,	  especially	  due	  to	  the	  function	  related	  to	  compiling	  the	  COSAC	  reports	  (Interview	  V). 	  
                                                16	  This	  is	  currently	  an	  official	  of	  the	  Cypriot	  House	  of	  Representatives.	  	  17	  When	  the	  respective	  national	  parliament	  assumed	  the	  Presidency.	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Note	   that	   the	   permanent	   member	   of	   COSAC,	   though	   an	   official	   of	   a	   national	  parliament,	   works	   for	   COSAC	   as	   a	   whole	   and	   not	   for	   a	   specific	   national	  parliament.18	  	  
 The	  main	   tasks	  of	   the	  COSAC	  Secretariat	   as	   such	  are	   stipulated	   in	   the	  Rules	  of	  Procedure	  (Rule	  9.4):	  	  "The	   COSAC	   Secretariat	   shall	   assist	   the	   Presidency	   Parliament	   in	   all	   its	   tasks.	  The	   members	   of	   the	   COSAC	   Secretariat	   shall	   perform	   their	   duties	   under	   the	  political	   responsibility	   of	   the	  COSAC	  Presidency	   and	   the	  Presidential	  Troika	  or	  according	   to	   the	   decisions	   taken	   by	   COSAC	  meetings.	   The	   Permanent	  Member	  shall	  coordinate	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  COSAC	  Secretariat	  under	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  Presidency	  Parliament."	  	  	  	  Against	   this	   background,	   the	   concrete	   tasks	   of	   the	   Secretariat	   can	   thus	   be	  grouped	  into	  two	  main	  categories	  in	  the	  practical	  process:	  	  
Secretarial/organizational	  issues	  related	  to	  (COSAC)	  meetings:	  The	  COSAC	  Secretariat	  provides	  assistance,	  support	  and	  advice	  to	  the	  Presidency	  Parliament	  by	  way	  of	  organising	  the	  meetings	  of	  the	  COSAC	  Chairpersons	  and	  the	  COSAC	  Plenary	  and	  as	  such	  takes	  care	  of	  any	  organizational	  issues	  related	  to	  this	  tasks	  (such	  as	  booking	  rooms).	  The	  COSAC	  Secretariat	  does	  not	  assist	  in	  preparing	  the	  Speakers'	  Conference;	  	  
Drafting	   COSAC	   documents:	   A	   bulk	   of	   the	   work	   of	   the	   Secretariat	   of	   COSAC	  meetings	   consists	   of	   drafting	   documents	   such	   as	   the	   COSAC	  Bi-­‐annual	   reports.	  The	   drafting	   of	   the	   Bi-­‐annual	   Report	   is	   based	   on	   Parliaments'	   replies	   to	   a	  questionnaire	   sent	   to	   Parliaments	   (national	   Parliaments	   and	   EP)	   on	   certain	  topics	  to	  be	  covered	  in	  the	  Bi-­‐annual	  Report	  and	  the	  COSAC	  Secretariat	  collects	  the	  replies	  and	  draws	  up	  a	  synthesis	  (Interview	  XVIIII).	   	  COSAC	  publishes	  such	  biannual	  reports	  on	  EU	  practices	  and	  procedures	  since	  2004	  and	   these	  give	  an	  insight	   about	   developments	   at	   the	  EU	   level	   and	  parliamentary	   practices	   in	   the	  member	  states	  (Hefftler	  and	  Gattermann	  2015).	  Moreover	  the	  COSAC	  Secretariat	  assists	  the	  secretariat	  of	  the	  Presidency	  Parliament,	  in	  preparing	  the	  documents	  for	  the	  COSAC	  meetings.	  It	  is	  the	  COSAC	  Secretariat	  that	  also	  drafts	  the	  minutes	  of	   the	  COSAC	  meetings.	  Note	  that	  within	   the	  COSAC	  Secretariat	   the	  workload	   is	  divided/distributed	   amongst	   the	  members	   of	   the	   Secretariat	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   a	  
                                                18	  In	  January	  2015	  the	  Permanent	  Member	  was	  an	  official	  from	  the	  Cypriot	  parliament	  supporting	  the	  Latvian	  Presidency.	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proposal	   by	   the	   Permanent	   Members	   who	   coordinates	   the	   activities	   of	   the	  Secretariat	  (Interview	  XVIIII).	  	  	  As	  alluded	  to	  before,	  there	  are	  close	  ties	  with	  the	  permanent	  representatives	  of	  national	   parliaments.	   Depending	   on	   the	   workload,	   officials	   of	   the	   COSAC	  Secretariat	  may	  attend	  Monday	  Morning	  Meetings.	  Also	  NPRs	  may	  attend	  COSAC	  meetings	   according	   of	   course	   to	   the	   internal	   arrangements	   of	   each	   national	  parliament	  and	  be	  able	   to	   “follow	  what	   is	  going	  on”.	  The	   information	  exchange	  goes	  thus	  both	  ways	  (Interview	  XVIIII).	  	  COSAC	   is	   not	   the	   only	   form	   of	   inter-­‐parliamentary	   cooperation	   that	   involve	  officials	   at	   least	   to	   some	   extent.	   	   The	   oldest	   form	   of	   inter-­‐parliamentary	  cooperation	   is	   the	   ‘Conference	  of	  Speakers	  of	   the	  Parliaments	  of	   the	  EU’	  which	  held	   its	   inaugural	  meeting	   in	   Rome	   in	   1963.	   Since	   1975	   they	   have	  met	   on	   an	  annual	   basis	   (before	   that	   only	   irregularly).	   The	   conference	   consists	   of	   the	  speakers	   of	   national	   parliamentary	   chambers	   and	   the	   President	   of	   the	   EP.	  Similarly	  to	  COSAC	  each	  conference	  is	  chaired	  by	  the	  speaker	  or	  president	  of	  the	  parliament,	  which	  holds	  the	  EU	  Presidency	  during	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  calendar	  year.	  	  Within	   the	   framework	   of	   inter-­‐parliamentary	   activities,	   the	   Conference	   of	  Speakers	  regards	  its	  own	  central	  functions	  as	  to	  safeguard	  and	  promote	  ‘the	  role	  of	   parliaments	   and	   carrying	   out	   common	   work	   in	   support	   of	   the	   inter-­‐parliamentary	   activities’,	   to	   represent	   a	   ‘forum	   for	   the	   exchange	   of	   opinions,	  information	   and	   experiences	   among	   the	   Speakers’	   and	   to	   ‘oversee	   the	  coordination	   of	   inter-­‐parliamentary	   EU	   activities’	   (Art.	   2,	   see	   EU	   Speakers’	  Conference,	   2010,	   in:	   Heffter	   and	   Gattermann	   2015).	   	   In	   this	   form	   of	   inter-­‐parliamentary	   cooperation,	   senior	   officials	   (heads	   of	   EU	   staff	   and	   heads	   of	   EU	  administration)	  play	  a	  role	  as	  they	  support	  their	  respective	  speakers	  but	  this	  can	  not	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  systematic	  form	  of	  inter-­‐parliamentary	  cooperation.	  The	  same	  is	  true	   for	   Inter-­‐parliamentary	  Conferences	  on	   specific	   issues	   such	  Economic	  and	  Monetary	  Union	  (EMU)	  and	  Common	  Foreign	  and	  Security	  Policy	  (CFSP).	  In	  the	  latter	   case	   delegates	   of	   standing	   committees	   (MPs)	   are	   supported	   and	  accompanied	   by	   EU	   experts	   or	   committee	   staff	   working	   for	   the	   respective	  sectoral	  committees.	  	  
	  
5.	  Conclusion	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Overall,	   we	   see	   that	   officials	   can	   play	   a	   key	   role	   in	   inter-­‐parliamentary	  cooperation.	   Here	   the	   network	   of	   NPRs	   can	   be	   attributed	   a	   central	   role.	   The	  network	   contributes	   to	   the	   attainment	   of	   common	   outcomes	   that	   could	  otherwise	  not	  be	  achieved	  by	  working	  as	  an	  information	  relay	  both	  towards	  their	  respective	  national	  legislatures	  and	  across	  national	  parliaments.	  	  	  It	  is	  in	  the	  very	  nature	   of	   the	   Lisbon	   provisions	   that	   a	   certain	   degree	   of	   coordination	   between	  national	   parliaments	   is	   needed	   in	   order	   to	   raise	   subsidiarity	   concerns.	   In	  practice,	  this	  coordination	  takes	  place	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  on	  the	  bureaucratic	  level.	  Officials	  in	  turn	  direct	  the	  attention	  of	  decision-­‐makers	  to	  issues	  that	  might	  be	  of	  political	  importance.	  	  
	  Overall,	   the	   review	   of	   the	   background	   and	   tasks	   of	   NPRs	   leads	   us	   two	  observations.	  On	   the	   one	  hand,	  NPRs	   share	   a	   common	  background	   and	  have	   a	  high	  level	  of	  expertise	  in	  parliamentary	  affairs,	  which	  would	  be	  in	  line	  with	  the	  concept	  of	  an	  epistemic	  community.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  their	  ties	  to	  their	  sending	  institution,	   to	   their	   respective	   national	   parliament,	   are	   very	   close	   and	   remain	  very	   close	   throughout	   their	   time	   in	  Brussels.	  Despite	   their	   similar	  background,	  they	  thus	  remain	  primarily	  ‘national	  agents’	  with	  a	  past	  and	  future	  in	  the	  service	  of	  the	  national	  parliament.	  A	  look	  at	  the	  tasks	  of	  the	  NPRs	  highlights	  information	  gathering	  and	  interpretation	  for	  the	  national	  level	  as	  their	  main	  role,	  followed	  by	  the	   facilitation	   of	   contacts	   with	   the	   European	   institutions	   and	   other	   Brussels	  actors.	   The	   representational	   function	   of	   parliamentary	   representatives	   is	  however	   comparatively	   weak.	   While	   they	   facilitate	   the	   attendance	   of	   political	  members	  of	  national	  parliaments	  in	  important	  fora	  and	  may	  inform	  other	  actors	  about	   the	   position	   of	   their	   parliament,	   the	   NPRs	   see	   themselves	   as	  administrators	  who	  are	  clearly	  not	  to	  negotiate,	  deliberate	  or	  decide	  on	  behalf	  of	  their	  parliaments.	  	   	  NPRs	  generally	  emphasized	  the	  importance	  of	  committee/plenary	  positions	  as	  a	  basis	   for	   action	   as	  well	   as	   their	   close	   ties	   to	   their	   respective	   parliaments.	   The	  career	   structures	   of	   parliamentary	   officials	   generally	   give	   credibility	   to	   such	  claims,	   as	  NPRs	  usually	   return	   to	   their	  parliaments	  after	  a	   couple	  of	  years	  and	  pursue	  a	  career	   in	   the	  domestic	  context.	  Finally,	  our	  analysis	  has	  reflected	  that	  NPRs	   proactively	   embrace	   subsidiarity	   scrutiny	   and	   parliamentary	   activity	  under	  the	  EWS	  and	  thus	  in	  general	  identified	  strongly	  with	  the	  mandate	  of	  their	  principals.	  	  The	   extensive	   information-­‐gathering	   and	   -­‐processing	   activities	   of	   the	   network	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are	   designed	   to	   facilitate	   political	   scrutiny.	   Especially	   for	   parliaments	   with	  weaker	   administrative	   capacity,	   being	   informed	   about	   the	   dossiers	   that	   other	  legislatures	  find	  problematic,	  can	  facilitate	  and	  sharpen	  parliamentary	  scrutiny.	  In	  addition,	  the	  fact	  that	  most	  NPRs	  see	  their	  future	  within	  their	  parliament	  and	  have	  closely	  knit	  ties	  facilitates	  political	  control.	  	  	  When	  comparing	  the	  network	  to	  other	  forms	  of	  inter-­‐parliamentary	  cooperation	  between	   officials	   we	   see	   that	   that	   the	   network	   of	   the	   NPRs	   is	   the	   most	  institutionalized.	  The	  COSAC	  Secretariat	  also	  consists	  of	  (parliamentary)	  officials	  but	  even	   then	   there	   is	  a	  strong	   link	  with	   the	  NPRs	  as	   these	  are	   to	  some	  extent	  part	  of	  the	  Secretariat.	  It	  is	  noteworthy	  that	  the	  COSAC	  Secretariat	  in	  turn	  feeds	  into	   the	   tasks	   that	   NPRs	   perform,	   by	   for	   example	   compiling	   information	   on	  parliamentary	   scrutiny	  by	  way	  of	   the	  bi-­‐annual	   reports.	  The	   role	  of	   the	  COSAC	  permanent	  member,	  who	  has	  to	  be	  a	  parliamentary	  member	  and	  very	  often	  has	  assumed	   the	   role	   of	   NPR	   of	   his/her	   respective	   parliament,	   is	   of	   paramount	  importance	  within	  the	  COSAC	  Secretariat.	  He	  or	  she	  coordinates	  the	  work	  of	  the	  COSAC	  Secretariat,	  works	  somewhat	  as	  a	  memory	  of	  the	  institution,	  and	  plays	  a	  key	  role	  in	  assisting	  the	  COSAC	  Presidency	  and	  the	  Presidential	  Troika.	  	  	  What	   is	   very	   interesting	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   the	   question	   of	   whether	   officials	  moderate	  mandates	  that	  are	  issued	  by	  respective	  national	  parliaments,	  is	  the	  fact	  that	   the	   permanent	   member	   of	   the	   COSAC	   Secretariat,	   does	   not	   work	   for	   a	  specific	  national	  parliament.	  Although	  he	  or	  she	  is	  a	  parliamentary	  official	  and	  as	  such	   has	   parliamentary	   expertise,	   he	   or	   she	   has	   to	   adopt	   a	   trans-­‐national	  parliamentary	   stance	  by	  working	   for	   the	   rotating	  Presidency.	  The	   same	   is	   true	  for	  officials	  working	  for	  the	  COSAC	  Secretariat	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  	  If	  we	  then	  come	  back	  to	  the	  question	  raised	  at	  the	  outset	  of	  the	  paper,	  of	  whether	  parliamentary	   officials,	   remain	   representatives	   of	   “their”	   respective	   national	  parliament	  or	  go	  ‘native’	  (Checkel	  2003)	  by	  adopting	  a	  European,	  trans-­‐national	  stance,	   a	   differentiated	   picture	   emerges.	   It	   thus	   seems	   in	   the	   very	   nature	   of	  officials	   working	   for	   the	   COSAC	   Secretariat	   to	   contribute	   to	   strengthening	   the	  
parliamentary	   stance	   across	   national	   parliaments	   by	   assisting	   COSAC	   in	   the	  exchange	   of	   information	   and	   best	   practices.	   Although	   officials	  working	   for	   the	  COSAC	  Secretariat	  are	  “delegates”	  from	  different	  national	  parliaments	  they	  have	  to	   support	   the	   rotating	   Council	   Presidency	   parliament	   in	   exercising	   its	   tasks.	  National	  interests	  thus	  move	  to	  the	  “back-­‐burner”.	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When	  it	  comes	  to	  NPRs	  we	  see	  that	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  are	  closely	  linked	  to	  their	  respective	  national	  parliaments	  and	  act	  and	  perceive	  themselves	  as	  “delegates”	  of	  their	  respective	  national	  legislature,	  does	  not	  contradict	  they	  fact	  that	  they	  can	  go	  “Europe”.	  They	  thus	  might	  play	  an	  important	  role	  in	  achieving	  trans-­national	  outcomes	   that	   might	   otherwise	   not	   be	   achieved,	   by	   providing	   information	   on	  whether	   their	   respective	   parliament	   is	   issuing	   a	   reasoned	   opinion	   against	   a	  Commission	  proposal.	  	  	  Comparatively	  speaking	  the	  role	  of	  officials	  at	  the	  Speakers	  Conferences	  is	  not	  as	  far-­‐reaching.	   Although	   high-­‐level	   parliamentary	   officials	   attend	   these	  meetings	  these	   contacts	   are	  more	   incidental	  when	   compared	   to	   officials	  working	   in	   the	  COSAC	   Secretariat	   or	   the	   representatives	   of	   national	   parliaments	   in	   Brussels.	  First	   observations	   point	   us	   into	   the	   direction	   that	   the	   same	   is	   true	   for	   inter-­‐parliamentary	   Conferences	   on	   issues	   such	   as	   CFSP	   and	   EMU.	   Also	   here	   the	  cooperation	  between	  officials	  is	  more	  incidental.	  	  In	   sum,	   officials,	   can	   be	   seen	   to	   play	   an	   important	   role	   in	   the	   context	   of	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